I wrote this paper in Sept 2001 to help me, and hopefully others to sort out and try to understand why we are chartered for change in the way we fight wars in the future and possibly to also help others who are involved in developing the military of the future. I feel that before we can march off to change things, we need to have a reason to change, and I feel that the Impetus for change can be summed up in the below writing. This of course is not all-inclusive but a quick look to help with the vision we require in order to move towards change. The old adage.. “Necessary is the Mother of invention” is as true a statement today, as it was when it was coined. Our craftiest adversaries will constantly shift their centers of gravity (COG) and as technologies and value systems change, new entities (ideas, structures, etc) will be created to protect and enhance these COGs. Without an impetus for change we cannot develop the vision, commitment and end effect we so desire.
Impetus for change
The US Military of the future will have to maintain a superiority delta in all phases of conflict, including search and destroy; peaceful or forceful entries; overcome and occupy, deter and protect modes of warfare plus becoming a catalyst of civil influence and change. Warfare in the future will be a system approach, which means that all contingencies will be of a Joint flavor, which includes inter-agency and coalition participation.
The US Military will have to work within current and projected flat budgets. Budgets of $300 billion per year in real terms are projected and $65 billion defense procurement goal necessitates Revolution in Military Affairs. Identifying failures is success in the business of experimentation. Divestiture processes provides the fiscal fuel within a flat defense budget to accelerate the development and fielding of advanced military technologies and systems in methods of employment and deployment. Joint Experimentation should help determine where, when, and how the limited defense resources are invested.
The US Military will have fewer, not more Soldiers, Sailors, Airman and Marines.
More equipment will be unmanned and remotely operated.
Any contingency will be coordinated with Other Government Agencies (OGA) and coalition partners/forces. OGA and coalition partners/forces involvement are required if lasting transitions are to be obtained. Effects should be built and tied to the Strategic level with specific objectives designed at the execution level.
The application of force should include a wide spectrum of options from less than lethal to lethal. Deadly force should only be used when other options are not feasible. Level of execution will be predicated on the commander’s assessment of the circumstances and his concept of operations should be a mix of all options. Note that deadly force in some instances negates lasting transitions.
Development of all equipment and training must maintain simplicity in order for constant augmentation of new civilian-soldier recruits. Fusion of young and old Americans is necessary to keep the mercenary out and will of the democracy in.
All Military actions outside the United States will include coordination with our international partners. However, the US Military and a wide variety of State and non-State actors still needs to be prepared to work independently should the circumstance dictate (not to rely on critical functions that could incapacitate our national objectives).
Forward basing of US Military will be drastically reduced or eliminated except for intelligence gathering and relationship building operations.
Deterrent to Chemical and Biological weapons must be developed but mass effect chemical and biological weapons of deadly force should not be developed for US Military use. Weapons of this nature do not discriminate and lack future vision of selective targeting principals. Riot control agents or other non-lethal technologies used for indiscriminate means of deployment are an exception and should be pursued for these special circumstances.
Precision and discriminate selections of targets tied to coordinated strategic (holistic- encompassing the entire range of elements of national power) effects will not only resolve conflicts sooner but also should improve the process of transition to peace after the conflicts are over.
The foundation in technology development should always be centered on Humanity. This does not preclude machines substituting for personnel. Machines will not be given free reign with regard to executing deadly force at will but, only at the direction of the human interface. As progress is made in the field of artificial intelligence and proves to be fully trusted and more effective than man, the human decision aspect of deadly force may be shifted to machines in the distant future but this will be wildly debatable as far as accountability.
RESULTS OR GOALS TO OBTAIN:
1. Level or reduce costs (Spending is not always flat but the overall plan for the Defense Budget should be tailored to a fixed amount over time with increases in only COLA). This means that the Military force as a whole system needs to be tied to a common budget in order for system of systems to be developed to reach this common goal. This will require a Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) over the way we do business today.
2. As effective as or more effective force as we have today (gauged against competition). Effectiveness has to be address over all Services as function of effects and not as just Core competencies. This might mean a shift in Core competencies as necessary to meet future requirements.
3. Permanent transitions have to have OGA and coalition support in order to have durable solutions. Transitions have to be planned before the conflict not after. Centers of gravity of the civilian populace from all sides have to have HOPE for things to be better — not worse than they were before the conflict started. This will require a new DoD/OGA lash-up/design.
4. Capacity for dealing ultimate will to win (deadly force) is necessary and should also be pursued, but as last resort or in self defense to opposition’s deadly force when no other means are available. Influence without death should be preferable for lasting peace to take hold. (Non Kinetic Technology & other non-lethal weapons development will be key for this goal)
5. Defend Human freedoms but more selective in administrating will of US by use of Military force. (Military should always be looked at as a piece of overall strategy with agencies and multinational participation… not as the sole solution)
FOCUS AREAS (Use as a guide to accomplish any measure of work):
People: Trained and emotionally equipped for future warfighting
Methods: New matrix organizations, fits new machines, materials and people.
Machines: Smaller, lighter and more effective.
Materials: Cheaper, regenerating, better placed, and reduced quantity.
The above four categories can be measured. In order to make recommendations on our progress we need to baseline what we have in these four areas today and compare them to what we propose to change. Current problem – this baseline of systems or (systems of systems) has not been established i.e., as a service example – what does it take to keep an F15 in the air… including manning (in the air, on ground, forward based, including costs and benefits); capital equipment to support; materials (fuel and other expendables); weapons provided and at what effectiveness; organization structure that supports aircraft; shelf life of equipment/training/etc.; etc, etc, etc.) This is a tall order, but it is something that all businesses have to do in order to survive.
Most of the answers will come from the Service side and should be part of our interface with them. How else can we truly recommend changes if we cannot qualify our results. However, the first step is interoperability, which we have not really focused on. We have focused instead on events (MC02/OC04/UV01…etc). These events try to establish new TTP’s/SOP’s that hopefully will become changed procedures for our troops. How do we know what quality is when we are trying to change things before we have even checked out the current system. This is one of the first laws of the great man; Deming who taught that you have to know what the system does before you can make modifications that will improve the quality. Striving to obtain these types of results will not give you complete resolve but it will give you efficiencies of total resources to produce a better performing military and one that will know what it can and can’t do but even more, it will generate an impetus for change.
Doctrine, Training and Personal fall under PEOPLE on the above focus areas
Organization, Leadership and (Training/Personal) fall under METHODS
Material and InFrastructure are under MATERIALS & MACHINES on the above focus areas